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Abstract I develop a new mechanism that exploits the leakage of information in finan-
cial markets to deliver herding and contrarian behavior, which I label “path-dependent
behavior.” The mechanism is related to the role of word-of-mouth communication in
transmitting information about stocks among traders. In practice, this occurs via deal-
ing interactions and a notable phenomenon called “the broker’s ear.” I find that, for
a suitably long trading history, path-dependent behavior is more likely the better the
quality of traders’ private information. Herding in the direction of the true state of the
world occurs almost surely for any initial beliefs, and it improves price informative-
ness. An external observer who underestimates/overestimates the rate of information
leakage will always overestimate/underestimate the quality of private information. I
also show that when the quality of private information is very high and the asymme-
try of information between traders and market maker is pronounced, the market is
expected to herd 50% of the time. Nonetheless, this has little impact on order imbal-
ance, excluding cases exhibiting catastrophic price behavior.
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1 Introduction
Over the past twenty-five years, the market microstructure literature (see Avery and
Zemsky 1998, AZ henceforth, and Cipriani and Guarino 2014) has linked the phe-
nomenon of event uncertainty (Easley and O’Hara 1992) to herd behavior. In this
paper, I introduce a new mechanism which describes a form of information leakage
in financial markets that can generate herd and contrarian behavior, phenomena that I
group under the label of path-dependent behavior (PDB).1 Like event uncertainty, this
mechanism exploits the asymmetry of information between traders and the marker
maker setting the price. Unlike event uncertainty, it does not require a shock in the
value of the asset. Changing the nature of the informational asymmetry has impor-
tant implications in terms of tractability,2 allowing the model to link beliefs and price
formation throughout time to information quality and market structure.
The proposed mechanism is related to the role of word-of-mouth communication
and networks in transmitting information about stocks among investors. In his book
Irrational Exuberance, Shiller (2015) notes that “word-of-mouth transmission of ideas
appears to be an important contribution to day-to-day or hour-to-hour stock market
fluctuations” (p. 155). In the same spirit, Hong et al. (2005) study the holdings and
trades of mutual fund managers working in the same city to test the hypothesis that they
exchange ideas by word-of-mouth. They find that this prediction is strongly confirmed
by the data at the level of both holdings and trades of thousands of securities.3
I think of the interaction of traders—whether acting as brokers or as dealers—on
trading floors (physical and virtual) as forming an information network. I model the
exchange/leakage of information about an asset by assigning each trader a type and
by assuming that traders on the same information network can observe each other’s
types. I assume two types: type I traders are always informed and receive a signal
about the (unknown) value of the asset; type II traders are informed with some known
probability and uninformed otherwise. If uninformed, traders buy and sell with equal
probability. I model the trading activity following Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Each
period, a trader is selected randomly to trade one unit of the asset with a competitive,
risk neutral and uninformed market maker. The market maker does not belong to the
network governing the flow of information about the asset. He posts a bid and an ask
price at which he buys and sells without knowing the type or the information of his
trading counterpart. Information is leaked because, through the observation of types,
1 The name alludes to the fact that, to generate herding and contrarianism, the sequence in which buys and
sells arrive matters as much as their number. See, for instance, Cipriani and Guarino (2014).
2 Event uncertainty requires three states of the world, which makes AZ’s model recursive. The model
presented in this paper requires only two states of the world to generate PDB.
3 An extensive literature documents the role of information networks and word-of-mouth to identify infor-
mation transfers in security markets. In particular: Hong et al. (2004) employ social networks to understand
the investment behavior of individual investors, whereas Cohen et al. (2008) use education networks to
identify the impact of information transfer between managers and corporate boards in security markets. For
a formal model of word-of-mouth communication, see Ellison and Fudenberg (1995).
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traders gain a better assessment of whether the market activity is more or less revealing
of the value of the asset.4
Herding occurs after a long enough sequence of type I buys which causes traders
to update their beliefs as if they had full information about the signal realizations. In
other words, information leaks from the long sequence of type I buys. At the same
time, the market maker has to consider the eventuality that the trades he observes
are generated by noise. This causes price rigidity to the point where traders find it
advantageous to buy regardless of their signal. On the other hand, contrarianism is
the consequence of type II trading activity. The probability of noise conditional on
observing a type II trader is higher than the overall fraction of noise traders. This
causes the price to overreact to type II trading activity and causes traders to ignore
their private information to go against the market.
As mentioned, AZ appeal to event uncertainty to generate herd behavior. Under
event uncertainty, a shock may cause the asset value to change. Traders receive a
signal informing them both about the occurrence of the shock and about the likelihood
of each possible new value, whereas the market maker can only learn about the shock
by observing their trading behavior. AZ conduct comparative statics with respect to
information quality for a given trading history. Due to the recursive nature of their
model, their analysis is limited to obtaining results “one step at a time.” They find
that, holding beliefs fixed at each point in time, herding occurs for values of the signal
precision below some threshold. In contrast, using the new mechanism in my model, I
can link the quality of information and market structure to price and belief formation
over time, and to the likelihood of different trading histories. This allows me to formally
prove that, for any trading history, there exists a threshold for the quality of private
information above which PDB occurs with positive probability.5
Moreover, I find that, after some critical time period in the trading history, there
exists a threshold for the quality of private information above which the probability
of PDB is higher the higher the quality of the traders’ information.6 Early on, the
trading history does not have much weight (i.e., does not contain much information),
and an increase in the quality of private information makes it more difficult for the
traders to disregard their private signal to follow or go against the crowd. For a long
enough trading history and for a high enough information quality, the weight of history
increases relatively more than the information contained in the private signal, the higher
the precision of the latter. This increases the probability of PDB.
PDB makes the price more volatile7; however, it does not lead to extreme price
behavior such as booms and crashes. No extreme price behavior is generated by traders’
communication, even if the marker maker is not aware of information leaking, as long
as he knows the quality of private information and the overall level of noise trading.
In fact, during a PDB episode, traders are aware that the trading activity is completely
uninformative. This gives the market maker the ability to catch up on the information
4 The assumptions on the availability of information to the market maker will be discussed in Sect. 1.1.
5 This is formalized in Theorem 1.
6 This is formalized in Proposition 2.
7 The fact that PDB generates larger bid-ask spreads is a consequence of the market maker’s pricing rule
formalized in Appendix A.1.
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that is available to the traders through their interaction. Overall, price informativeness
is improved as more information is available to the traders, triggering herding in the
direction of the true state of the world, which, on average, suppresses the opinion of
traders receiving incorrect signals.8
In fact, in the limit, for any initial beliefs, PDB occurs almost surely in the form of
herd behavior in the direction of the correct state of the world, while the likelihood
of contrarianism converges to zero.9 This is because contrarianism requires a low rate
of information leakage, but when the rate of information leakage is low, the price
is too sticky, which hinders contrarianism. In general, for any level of information
leakage, the market structure outlined above is characterized by a high degree of price
stickiness which helps herding but hinders contrarianism.
Studying the limit (for t → ∞) behavior of a market with information leakage,
I find that an increase in the quality of information results in a monotonic increase
in order imbalance.10 In this case, market participants will not be confused between
poorly and well informed markets, as long as they are aware that the market structure
allows for herding. In contrast, when a market analyst misjudges the market struc-
ture by either overestimating or underestimating the leakage of information in the
market, he will always underestimate or overestimate the quality of private informa-
tion, respectively.11 Specifically, an analyst underestimating the information leakage
attributes too much of the order imbalance to the quality of the private information
rather than to the fact that this is leaking.
In particular, when an analyst is completely unaware of information leakage, the
overestimation of the signal precision is non-monotonic in the quality of information.12
There are three factors contributing to this result. First, at low levels, increasing the
signal precision increases the speed of buildup of the difference in beliefs between the
traders and the market maker, triggering herding. Second, at low levels, increasing the
signal precision makes the time of recovery from herding longer, as the informational
content of the last non-herding trade is larger. The latter constitutes the informational
gap that the market maker needs to eliminate in order to catch up with the traders
and to recover normal trading. At low levels of the signal precision, both factors
increase the distortion in inference about information quality. Third, as the signal
quality increases, the probability of receiving an incorrect signal decreases. Since
herding goes, on average, in the direction of the true state of the word, the less likely
the realization of an incorrect signal, the less likely herding is to alter trading activity.
For a sufficiently high level of the signal precision, this third effect takes over and the
distortion in the inference about information quality starts decreasing.
Despite the mild impact of PDB on the price, traders can spend a large amount
of time herding. In particular, when all information available is leaked, the signal
precision is very high, and the level of noise trading is neither too high nor too low, the
8 This is formalized in Corollary 1.
9 This is formalized in Proposition 1.
10 This is illustrated in Fig. 3.
11 This is formalized in Proposition 3.
12 This is illustrated in Fig. 2.
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market is expected to herd 50% of the time.13 Clearly, both the facts that the quality
of information is high and that it is made perfectly available to all traders exacerbate
the asymmetry of information between the traders and the market maker. Too much
noise trading would not generate enough information to be leaked causing the price
to be sticky, whereas low levels of noise trading allow the marker maker to keep up
with the information in trading activity.
1.1 The role of the market maker
Modeling the market maker as an agent completely cut out of the information network
needs some further discussion. The market maker can be interpreted as an arbitrary
price fixing mechanism, such as a Walrasian auctioneer, or as a traditional liquidity
provider. The market maker is not completely uninformed. But, because he is not
directly interacting with traders second by second, in the middle of the fray, he can
find himself relatively uninformed compared to speculators and brokers. Speculators
or brokers have the opportunity, the ability and the incentive to share information with
one another. As a result, information can leak and spread among informed traders for
a variety of reasons, some voluntary and some involuntary, leaving the market maker
at an informational disadvantage.
For instance, once a trade is executed there is more to gain than to lose in letting
others know that “some known bank” or “a significant market participant” has just
placed its bets one way or another. In fact, traders want others to do the same in order
to move the market in a favorable direction (MacKenzie 2008a; Van Bommel 2003).
Another reason to voluntarily share information lies in the reciprocity of traders’
relationships with one another. Information about the latest transactions and mood wit-
nessed on the local trading floor is repaid by granting favorable prices and volunteering
further information. These links of reciprocity facilitate the flow of information and
allow traders to track the market “as it is made” (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002).
Belonging to a business network enables a trader to gain an information edge and to
profit from it before others.
Moreover, sharing information is a major part of what clients expect from their
brokers. While they would not explicitly reveal the identity of market actors, “there
is a grey area where euphemisms can be used [such as] ‘the usual German’ has just
done something” (MacKenzie 2008b).
Information can leak involuntarily when a broker who is not member of an exchange,
or who does not have access to a trading venue, needs to pass on his order to another
broker for execution. Before the order hits the market, many parties might get sight or
hear rumors of it. For instance, where trading floors are still physical places, traders
overhear conversations around them. Sociologists conducting field studies on trad-
ing floors witness a well-known phenomenon called the “broker’s ear.” MacKenzie
(2008b) reports the following statement by a trader: “When you’re on the desk you’re
expected to hear everyone else’s conversations as well, because they are all relevant
to you, and if you are on the phone speaking to someone about what’s going on in the
13 This is illustrated in Fig. 4.
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market there could be a hot piece of information coming in with one of your colleagues
that you would want to tell your clients, so you’ve got to be able to hear it coming in
as you’re speaking to the person.”
The information channels outlined so far might also offer a way to understand
how the market maker in AZ can be completely unaware of an informational event
(e.g., new management, a merger), even though enough traders to generate herding
receive this information from contacts, before any private announcement has been
made. In support of this, Schindler (2007) reports, based on his 2003 survey of traders
in stocks, bonds, FX and commodity markets, that about 70% of traders answered that
when they overhear rumors, or have other first-hand information, they spread them to
a few priority people in the hope that later they will reciprocate and do the same. This
way, traders build information networks that evolve in such a way that for a while those
in a network know more than others in the market. This pattern has been confirmed
by about 80% of the traders surveyed.
With regard to older floor-based trading, Baker (1984) studies network patterns and
formation within crowds in markets for stock options. The larger the crowd, the more
the limitations to communication due to noise and physical separation. To overcome
this, traders organize themselves in multiple cliques. Market makers cannot necessarily
monitor the behavior in all the cliques. Baker (1984) reports the detrimental effects
of large crowds to communication as described by a veteran market maker: “In really
large crowds [· · · ] it’s noisy; you can’t hear. It happens when the stock is changing.
Some people trade, and they tell others, and then lots of people are coming over. There
are some aberrations sometimes.”
Finally, assuming that the market maker does not belong to any information network
might be considered as a modeling artifice to understand the subset of traders who will
herd. Only traders who think they are more informed than the market maker will herd.
In contrast, traders who occupy a marginal position within an information network
would rationally take the price as a more accurate valuation of the asset than their own.
Hence, such traders would behave as in a Glosten–Milgrom market and always follow
their signal. In this sense, the model does not exclude the possibility that the market
maker is more informed than some traders. Only the traders who are more connected
would engage in PDB. These are the traders I am interested in.
1.2 Other related literature
Other mechanisms have been exploited to generate herd and contrarian behavior in
financial markets. Notably, Park and Sabourian (2011) generalize event uncertainty
by pointing out that any U-shaped signal with positive or negative bias—i.e., a signal
moving probability mass from moderate to extreme states with a bias toward positive
or negative states, respectively, is necessary and almost sufficient to generate herd
behavior. Hence, it is the shape of the signal and not the multiple layers of uncertainty
that is responsible for herding. Their paper also shows that herding is possible, if not
even simpler to characterize, when signals have the monotone likelihood property.
In Chari and Kehoe (2004), endogenous timing in the trading decision brings the
usual trade-off between investing and waiting to invest. Once this trade-off is resolved,
123
Path-dependent behavior and information leakage
future information will never be revealed and all traders hurry to decide independently
of it.
In Lee (1998) information remains trapped because of transaction costs, which
makes it unprofitable for traders to act on their private signal. While information is
trapped, only traders with good news buy the asset, increasing its price. Once a trader
with sufficiently high-quality information sells, all the negative information finally
reaches the market making the price collapse.
In Dasgupta and Prat (2008) and Dasgupta and Prat (2006) portfolio managers
ignore their private information to follow the crowd because of career concerns. Good
portfolio managers receive correlated signals; thus, they prefer to ignore their private
information as investors are more likely to believe that a manager is good but unlucky
when he fails along with others, rather than when he fails alone.
Finally, Bose et al. (2008) model the interaction between an exogenous sequence
of informed buyers and a monopolist seller who sets the price in order to learn from
the buyers’ decisions. As in the literature mentioned so far, prices adjust to reflect the
information revealed from past trades. But in addition, the monopolist sets prices so
as to control the learning process. Initially, the seller charges high separating prices to
allow the buyers to learn, while he eventually induces a purchase cascade by setting a
pooling price.
2 The model
There is a countable number of risk neutral agents/traders N = {1, 2, . . .} who are
selected randomly and anonymously to trade with a perfectly competitive and risk
neutral market maker. They trade one unit of the only asset in the economy, asset that
can take value V ∈ {0, 1}. Traders act sequentially and only once in their lifetime.
Time is discrete, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }, where T is the time when the asset is liquidated
and the capital gain (loss) is realized. At each t , the market maker posts a bid Bt and an
ask At price at which he commits to trade. Agents, if called to trade, decide whether
to buy, sell or not trade given those prices. Indicate a generic action/trade at t with at ,
while the realized price at time t is denoted by V mt .
Agents can be of two types: they are either type I traders with probability (1 − λ),
or they are type II traders. Type I traders are informed with probability one and receive
a signal σ about the value of the asset, while type II traders are either informed with
probability (1 − μ) or noise traders with probability μ. Both types’ draws and the
draws determining whether a type II trader is informed or not are independent and
independent from each other. Noise traders trade for liquidity reasons and they are
assumed to buy and sell with equal probability.14
Signals can be either high (H ) or low (L) and, conditional on V , they are
independent. The probability that a signal reveals the true state is p > 12 , i.e.,
Pr {σ = H | V = 1} = Pr {σ = L | V = 0} = p, where the initial common prior
14 The case where noise traders do not trade is omitted. Noise traders can be thought of as individuals
coming to the market because they experience a liquidity shock or the need to hedge risk. These events
force them to modify their portfolio, so one needs to actively trade to qualify as noise trader.
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is π0 = Pr {V = 1} = 12 . I use the convention that informed traders receive their
signal only at the moment in which they are called to trade. This is without loss of
generality and it implies that, before being called to trade, traders share the same
valuation for the asset.
Each period, the selected trader is assigned a type which can be observed by the
other traders but not by the market maker. Hence, if a trader is observed to be of type I,
he is automatically recognized to be informed, although his signal cannot be observed
by anybody else but himself. If the selected trader is observed to be of type II, his
fellow traders cannot distinguish whether he is informed or a noise trader. The market
maker does not know either the type or the signal. He just receives the trading order
and executes it, while the other traders observe the realized price.
The different possible transactions in every period together with all the possible bid
and ask prices form the space Ω = {buy, sell, no trade} × [0, 1]2, which is identical
for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }. The space of all possible trading sequences is H = ∏Tt=1 Ωt ,
where Ωt = Ω . Call F the algebra on H, and {Ft } the corresponding filtration.
Each trader’s information is composed of three parts: the trading history, the vector
of types of those who traded before him, and his private signal σ i . Formally, indicate
with τt a random variable that takes value 1 if the trader at t is of type I and 0 if
the trader at t is of type II. Call N = ΠTt=1 {1, 0}t the history of types and {Tt }
the corresponding filtration. Then, each trader’s information structure at time t is
represented by the filtration
{
I it
}
=
{
Ft , Tt , σ i
}
.
Call π it the posterior probability that, at time t , agent i assigns to the event that the
true value of the asset is 1, formally:
π it = Pr
(
V = 1 | at , I it
)
= Pr
(
at | V = 1,Ft , Tt , σ i
)
π it−1
Pr
(
at | V = 1,Ft , Tt , σ i
)
π it−1 + Pr
(
at | V = 0,Ft , Tt , σ i
) (
1 − π it−1
) ,
where σ i = ∅ if i is not trading at t . Correspondingly, the traders’ valuation of the
asset is
V it = E
[
V | at , I it
]
= π it
It is understood that the optimal decision for an informed trader i called to trade at
time t is
buy if V it > At , (1)
sell if V it < Bt . (2)
Call πmt the probability that the market maker assigns to the event that V = 1 given
the trading history at the end of time t :
123
Path-dependent behavior and information leakage
πmt = Pr (V = 1 | at ,Ft )
= Pr (at | Ft , V = 1) π
m
t−1
Pr (at | Ft , V = 1) πmt−1 + Pr (at | Ft , V = 0)
(
1 − πmt−1
) . (3)
Correspondingly, the market maker’s valuation of the asset is:
V mt = E [V | at ,Ft ] = πmt .
In setting the price at the beginning of time t , the market maker does not know
whether he will be facing a buy or a sell order. Conditional on a buy or a sell, he posts
an ask and a bid price, respectively, so that the zero profit condition is satisfied:
At = E
[
V | Ft , at = buy
] = E
[
V | Ft , V it > At
]
(4)
Bt = E [V | Ft , at = sell] = E
[
V | Ft , V it < Bt
]
. (5)
Due to the presence of a price mechanism, I adopt the same definition of herding and
contrarianism as Avery and Zemsky (1998) and Park and Sabourian (2011). Roughly,
an agent is herding if he disregards his private signal to trade in the direction of the
market, while an agent engages in contrarian behavior if he disregards his private
signal to trade against the market. Following Avery and Zemsky (1998) and Park and
Sabourian (2011), the definitions are given abstracting from bid and ask prices.
Definition 1 (Herding–Contrarianism) A trader with signal σ i engages in herd
behavior at time t if he buys when V i1
(
σ i
)
< V m1 < V
m
t or if he sells when
V i1
(
σ i
)
> V m1 > V
m
t ; and buying (or selling) is strictly preferred to other actions.
A trader with signal σ i engages in contrarian behavior if he buys when V i1
(
σ i
)
< V m1
and V mt < V m1 , and if he sells when V
i
1
(
σ i
)
> V m1 and V mt > V
m
1 ; and buying (or
selling) is strictly preferred to other actions.
As AZ point out, for herd buying to occur three things need to happen. First, without
observing any trading history, the trader sells at t = 1. Second, the history of trades
must be positive. Third, despite the increase in price, the trader must be willing to buy
after having observed the trading history. Herding can be interpreted as a situation
where the price has not moved as much as the trader’s valuation after observing a
positive trading history. Correspondingly, for contrarian buying to occur three things
need to happen. First, the trader sells at t = 1. Second, the trading history must lead
to a decrease in the price. Third, the trader must be willing to buy after observing the
trading history. Contrarianism is the consequence of the price reacting too much to
the trading history compared to the traders’ valuation. In general, PDB, whether this
is herding or contrarianism, is triggered when traders who would have followed their
signal at t = 1 disregard it after observing the trading history.
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2.1 Traders’ updating and market maker’s pricing rule
Traders’ updating As informed traders receive a signal only when called to trade,
before being called all share the same valuation of the asset. In particular, all agree
on whether the conditions for PDB are met. Since they differ only by their signal, if
one of them engages in PDB at t , all of them would. It follows that a type I trader
engaging in PDB at t does not release any information to the other traders. Similarly,
if the conditions for PDB are in place and a type II trader is observed, his actions are
uninformative as well because he is either engaging in PDB or he is a noise trader. In
both cases, V it = V it−1 for every i.
Consider a time t when the conditions for PDB are not met. The traders’ valuation is
determined by the trading history through the difference between the number of high
signals and the number of low signals implicitly “observed” through type I trades,
and by the difference between the number of type II buys and the number type II sells
observed up to time t . Formally, let ht and lt be the number of type I buys and sells, and
bit and sit be the number of type II buys and sells observed up to time t , respectively.
Then, for every i ,
V it =
pht−lt
[
μ
2 + (1 − μ) p
]bit −sit
pht−lt
[
μ
2 + (1 − μ) p
]bit −sit + (1 − p)ht−lt [μ2 + (1 − μ) (1 − p)
]bit −sit
.
(6)
Market maker’s pricing rule Given the trading history, the market maker fixes bid and
ask prices conditional on the traders’ strategies, as formalized by (4) and (5). When
the conditions for PDB are not met, the strategy of an informed trader is to buy upon
the reception of a high signal and to sell upon the reception of a low signal. If the
conditions for PDB are in place, the market maker needs to account for the fact that
an informed trader buys or sells regardless of his signal.
I focus the analysis on the ask price as the bid price is determined similarly. First I
derive the pricing rule in an example to illustrate the ideas before providing the general
rule. In the example I show how the market maker computes the expected value of the
asset in the eventuality that traders might be herding as early as t = 3. I then generalize
the example for the case in which path-dependent buying occurs for the first time at
t . Finally, I show that this expected value constitutes a rational expectations price.
Example Consider a trading history F3 =
{(
B, V m1
)
,
(
B, V m2
)}
, and suppose that
up until t = 3 no possibility of PDB has arisen. Then, F3 is compatible with four
“type histories”
{
G j3
}4
j=1:
F3
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(B, B)
→
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
((B, τ = 1) , (B, τ = 1))
((B, τ = 1) , (B, τ = 0))
((B, τ = 0) , (B, τ = 1))
((B, τ = 0) , (B, τ = 0))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
← G13← G23← G33← G43
{
G j3
}4
j=1
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Indicate with E
[
V | G j3
]
the valuation of a trader who has observed G j3 . Suppose that
p, λ and μ are such that a trader observing G13 is going to herd if the market maker sets
the ask price at t = 3 conditioning on the fact that only noise traders and traders with
a high signal are buying. Then, such price cannot be the equilibrium price. Facing a
buy order at t = 3 , the market maker needs to consider the following scenarios:
(B, B, B) →
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
G13
↗
→
↘
L
H
noise
G23 ,G33 ,G43
↗
↘
H
noise
The market maker needs to compute E
[
V | F3, a3 = buy
]
allowing for the pos-
sibility of a trader on G13 to buy with a low signal. Then, if this expected value is
still smaller than E
[
V | G13 , σ 3 = H,
]
, he can set A3 = E
[
V | F3, a3 = buy
]
as the
rational expectations price. unionsq
In order to generalize what illustrated in the previous example to the case where
PDB occurs for the first time at a generic t , define
 =
{
(B, τ = 0) , (S, τ = 0) , (B, τ = 1) , (S, τ = 1)
}
to be the type space. Moreover, define the set of all possible T -dimensional vectors
of type sequences as T = ∏Tt=1 t , where t =  for every t . Call G the algebra
on T and {Gt } its generic filtration.
At time t , traders observe a type history G jt and compute E
[
V | G jt
]
. The market
maker observes the trading history Ft which, without any previous possibility of PDB,
is compatible with 2t type histories
{
G jt
}2t
j=1, as illustrated below:
Ft →
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
G1t
G2t
...
G2tt
→ E [V | G1t
]
→ E [V | G2t
]
...
→ E
[
V | G2tt
]
The traders’ valuation along theG jt paths depends on the number and the type of buys
and sells as specified in (6). In particular, the higher the number of type I buys and the
number of type II sells, the larger the difference E
[
V | G jt
]
−E [V | Ft ] and the easier
for path-dependent buying to occur. For any trading history, without any possibility
of PDB in the past, there is a unique G j∗t such that E
[
V | G j∗t
]
= max j E
[
V | G jt
]
.
Along G j∗t , all buys are of type I and all sells are of type II. Indicate with bmt the total
number of buy orders and with smt the total number of sell orders observed at the end
of time t . If path-dependent buying occurs for the first time at t , it must be happening
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on G j∗t . If bmt > smt then it is herd buying, while if bmt < smt it is contrarian buying.
Hence, when computing the ask price for the case of first-time path-dependent buying,
the market maker only needs to consider this unique type path, whose associated value
I indicate with V Bt−1 = E
[
V | G j∗t
]
.
The probability of a single type history is the probability of r successes in t Bernoulli
trials, where r is the number of type I trades in the history. Formally,
Pr
(
G jt | Ft
)
=
(
t
r
)
[Pr (τ = 0)]t−r [Pr (τ = 1)]r .
For each time t , define the probability of the type history corresponding to the highest
valuation V Bt−1 as
ηBt = Pr
(
G j∗t | Ft
)
=
(
t
bt
)
λt−bt (1 − λ)bt ,
Appendix A.1 shows that, given a trading history Ft such that no PDB could have
occurred before time t and such that on the type path G j∗t an informed trader buys
regardless of his signal, the following expected value constitutes a rational expectations
equilibrium price:
At = E
[
V | Ft , at = buy
]
=
[
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) p
]
V mt−1 + ηBt (1 − λμ) (1 − p) V Bt−1
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ)
[
pV mt−1 + (1 − p)
(
1 − V mt−1
)] + ηBt (1 − λμ)
[
(1 − p) V Bt−1 + p
(
1 − V Bt−1
)] .
(7)
If the probability of PDB ηBt is zero, (7) reduces to the expected value of the asset
given that only noise traders or informed traders with a high signal are going to buy at
t . If ηBt > 0, the market maker needs to consider that on the type path G j
∗
t an informed
trader buys with a low signal. Conditional on V = 1, the probability of an informed
trader with a low signal is (1 − λμ) (1 − p) and V Bt−1 is the valuation of a trader who
has observed G j∗t .
In Appendix A.1 I show that the ask price in periods of PDB, i.e., when ηBt > 0,
is always higher than the ask price in periods without PDB, i.e., when ηBt = 0. The
reason is that, although the market maker is factoring in the possibility of an informed
trader buying with a low signal, this trader has a very high asset valuation along the
type path G j∗t , namely V Bt−1. This also implies that the bid-ask spread in periods of
PDB is larger than in “normal” periods of trading, confirming the observation that
volatility is higher when traders herd. By setting a larger spread the marker maker
recuperates the losses incurred due to the adverse selection caused by information
leakage.
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3 Herding and contrarian behavior
This section establishes the conditions for PDB to occur for the first time at t . Typi-
cally, the reasoning used to prove the existence of herd behavior invokes the activity of
noise traders: in finite time any trading history has positive probability; noise trading
can always generate trading histories compatible with herding, hence the existence
of herding. In my model, type realizations are as important for herding as the trading
history they are compatible with. In fact, noise can generate trading histories whose
compatible type histories meet the conditions for herding, but the very fact of assuming
noise to generate those histories rules out herding. Herd buying (selling) is a conse-
quence of the under-reaction of the market maker’s price to a long enough history
of type I buys (sells). Noise can lead to contrarianism because during the realization
of type II trades the price moves too much for the amount of information actually
present in the market. Contrarian buying (selling) is a consequence of the excess of
information the market maker assigns to a sequence of type II sells (buys).
Recall that p, λ and μ, respectively, are the signal precision, the probability of
type II trades and the probability of being a noise trader conditional on being type II.
Further, recall that ht and lt are the number of high an low signals implicitly observed
by the traders along the type history, and that bit and sit are the number of type II buys
and sells. Also, bmt and smt are the number of buys and sells (of both types) observed
by the market maker along the trading history up to time t .
The proof of the existence of PDB is achieved in two steps. First, Theorem 1 estab-
lishes conditions on p, λ and μ involving both the trading history and the compatible
type realizations under which herd and contrarian buying occur with probability one.
Then, Theorem 2 shows that trading histories satisfying the conditions for PDB exist
with positive probability.
Theorem 1 (Conditions for path-dependent behavior) Consider a trading history
Ft such that no path-dependent behavior could have occurred before t . Then, for
every λ ∈ (0, 1) and μ ∈ (0, 1], and for every G jt compatible with Ft such that
ht−1 − lt−1 = 1 and bit−1 − sit−1 = 0 do not occur simultaneously at t − 1:
1. If ht−1 − lt−1 < 2λμ − 1 +
(
bit−1 − sit−1
) ( 1
λ
− 1) there exists a cutoff level 12 <
p∗t (λ, μ) < 1 such that path-dependent buying occurs at t if and only if 1 > p >
p∗t (λ, μ);
2. If ht−1 − lt−1 ≥ 2λμ − 1 +
(
bit−1 − sit−1
) ( 1
λ
− 1) path-dependent buying occurs
at t for every value of p ∈ ( 12 , 1
)
.
Moreover,
3. ∂p
∗
t
∂λ
< 0 if and only if bmt > smt ;
4. ∂p
∗
t
∂μ
< 0 for any Ft leading to path-dependent behavior.
Proof See Appendix A.2. unionsq
The theorem states that for any given type history G jt , there exists a threshold
p∗t (λ, μ) above which path-dependent buying takes place for the first time at t . The
larger p, the larger the effect of the asymmetry of information between the traders and
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the market maker for any level of noise and type composition. If type I trades contain
relatively more information for the traders than for the market maker and type II trades
are assigned relatively more information by the market maker than by the traders, then
a long enough sequence of type I buys or type II sells is going to make the difference
in beliefs π it−1 −πt−1, and hence in valuations V it−1 − V mt−1, increase more the higher
the signal precision.
When the precision p = 1, the absolute difference in valuations between the traders
and the market maker is always (weakly) positive and all informed traders act alike,
not because they are herding but because they all receive the same, perfectly revealing
information. In contrast, when p = 12 , the signal is completely uninformative and
traders do not learn anything from it or by observing the other market participants’
behavior. The price remains equal to its initial value π0 and no learning takes place.
It is important to notice that, in equilibrium, the case considered in point (2) of
Theorem 1 does not occur. If the event in point (2) occurred in equilibrium, the thresh-
old p∗t (λ, μ) would already have decreased to 12 . As the traders’ signal precision p
is strictly greater than 12 , the type history leading to the condition in point (2) would
have satisfied the condition in point (1) in a prior period, triggering PDB. To illustrate,
consider a type history Gt such that the inequality in point (1) holds. Corresponding
to this history there exists a cutoff p∗t (λ, μ), such that PDB occurs if and only if the
signal precision is larger than the cutoff. Hence, if the signal precision is smaller than
p∗t (λ, μ), PDB does not occur at t . Then, for the cutoff p∗t (λ, μ) to decrease below
the signal precision p, the type history must evolve so that the inequality of point (1)
holds less tightly. As the type history unfolds in such a direction, eventually, the cutoff
falls below the signal precision. Once this happens, PDB is triggered.
DefineΓ = 1−λ1−λμ to be the rate at which information is “leaked,” i.e., the probability
that a trader is of type I given that he is informed. The numerator is equal to the
probability that an informed trader is known to be informed to the rest of the market,
while the denominator is the overall probability of informed trading. When λ = 0
there are no type II traders and all information is leaked. There is no asymmetry of
information because the market maker knows that all the traders are observed to be
informed. By increasing λ, the asymmetry of information initially increases and then
it decreases to a situation where there are only type II traders and no information is
leaked. Notice that Γ = 1 also when the probability of noise conditional of observing a
type II trader μ = 1. All information is leaked; however, traders retain an informational
advantage over the market maker in detecting noise traders, making PDB possible.
Increasing either λ or μ leads to an increase in the overall level of noise. However,
by increasing μ, although the total amount of information decreases, more of it is
leaked, increasing the asymmetry of information between traders and the market maker
monotonically. It follows that the effect of an increase in the conditional noise μ is
always beneficial to the occurrence of PDB. In case of herding, it dampens the market
maker’s price adjustment to type I trading. In case of contrarianism, it makes the price
too reactive to type II trading. Hence, an increase in μ enlarges the set of values of the
signal precision leading to PDB.
When the condition for path-dependent buying is consistent with herding, namely
when bmt > smt , the cutoff p∗ above which a trader buys with a low signal decreases
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with λ or, equally, it increases with the leakage rate Γ . This is because herding needs
the price to be sticky. A larger leakage rate makes the price more reactive to the traders’
activity. Hence, for a given realization of the type history Gt satisfying the conditions
of Theorem 1, if the price is more reactive due to an increase in the leakage rate, the
signal threshold p∗t increases. Lower signal precisions can no longer generate enough
asymmetry of information in the interpretation of the trading history for herding to
occur.
When bmt < smt , the conditions of Theorem 1 are consistent with contrarian buying.
Contrarianism needs the price to be “too reactive” to the realization of the type history.
An increase in the leakage rate makes the price more reactive, which results in a
decrease in the threshold p∗t for a decrease in λ. In fact, when the price reacts more to
a given realization of the type history Gt , even lower levels of the signal precision are
compatible with contrarian buying.
Next, I show that PDB occurs with positive probability except when p = 12 or 1.
The following notation is introduced for the log-likelihood ratios of various events:
L = log Pr (at = buy | V = 1, τt = 1)
Pr (at = buy | V = 0, τt = 1) ,
Lμ = log Pr (at = buy | V = 1, τt = 0)
Pr (at = buy | V = 0, τt = 0) ,
Lλ = log Pr (at = buy | V = 1)
Pr (at = buy | V = 0) ,
where L ≥ Lλ ≥ Lμ for every p, λ and μ.
Theorem 2 (Existence of path-dependent behavior) For p ∈ { 12 , 1
}
path-dependent
behavior does not occur for any trading history Ft and any λ,μ ∈ [0, 1]. For
p ∈ ( 12 , 1
)
, 0 < λ < 1 and μ = 0, path-dependent behavior occurs with posi-
tive probability. In particular, path-dependent buying occurs with positive probability
for the first time at t whenever Ft is such that
bmt−1 ≥
L + Lλ
L − Lλ − s
m
t−1
Lλ − Lμ
L − Lλ . (8)
Proof See Appendix A.3. unionsq
For an intuition of Theorem 2, consider the case where the market opens with a
series of bmt−1 type I buys in the first t − 1 periods. Then, the number of high signals
ht−1 = bmt−1 and if at t an individual with a low signal is called to trade, he will herd
at t for given values of p, λ and μ if bmt−1 ≥
[
Lλ + L] / [L − Lλ] since smt−1 = 0.
Suppose, instead, that the market opens with a sequence of smt−1 type II sells in the
first t − 1 periods. Then, bmt−1 = 0 and an individual with a low signal who is called
to trade at t engages in contrarian buying if smt−1 ≥
[
L + Lλ] / [Lλ − Lμ]. In the
extreme cases where λ = 0 and λ = 1, or where μ = 0, there is no asymmetric
information between the traders and the market maker, making PDB impossible.
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Since the market maker only observes the trading history Ft , he will never know
for sure whether PDB is happening at any time t . Traders, on the other hand, observe
the type realization and are aware of PDB taking place. Traders do not update their
beliefs during times of PDB, while the price keeps moving with the trading activity.
For this reason, no informational cascades in the sense of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer
and Welch Bikhchandani et al. (1992) will ever happen in this market. Eventually, the
price will catch up with the market beliefs and normal trading will recover.
3.1 Market limit behavior and price informativeness
Theorems 1 and 2 establish the existence of PDB. However, how likely is PDB?
Proposition 1 states that starting from any trading history, herd behavior occurs almost
surely.
Proposition 1 Consider any starting trading history Fτ generating beliefs π iτ−1 and
πmτ−1. For any continuation trading history Fτ+t , path-dependent behavior arises
almost surely as t → ∞: it takes the form of herd buying when V = 1 and of herd
selling when V = 0. Moreover, as t → ∞, contrarian behavior almost never happens.
Proof See Appendix A.4. unionsq
At time t , the probability of path-dependent buying is equal to15
Pr
[(
L − Lλ) (ht−1 − lt−1) > L + Lλ +
(
Lλ − Lμ)
(
bit−1 − sit−1
)]
. (9)
On the left-hand side of the inequality, the difference ht−1 − lt−1 (the difference
in high and low signals) captures how much type I realizations matter at t , as type
realizations matter only if the corresponding imbalance between buys and sells is
large. The term L − Lλ captures how sticky the price is in response to type I trades.
Overall,
(
L − Lλ) (ht−1 − lt−1) captures how much price stickiness matters for a
given realization of type I trades at t . On the right-hand side of the inequality, the
difference bit−1 − sit−1 (type II buys and sells), captures how much type II realizations
matter at t . The term Lλ−Lμ captures how over-reactive the price is in response to type
II trades. Overall,
(
Lλ − Lμ) (bit−1 − sit−1
)
captures how much price over-reactivity
matters for a given realization of type II trades at t .
As t → ∞, only herd behavior in the direction of the true state of the world
survives. In the limit, the importance of L + Lλ vanishes, and the inequality in (9) is
satisfied only when V = 1. When V = 1, and as t → ∞, noise buys and sells cancel
out, whereas informed trading creates an order imbalance in the direction of buys.
Hence, the condition for path-dependent buying is satisfied by herd buying. When
V = 0, as t → ∞, the probability in (9) goes to zero, which rules out any form of
path-dependent buying when V = 0. A similar and symmetric argument can be made
to establish that only herd selling survives in the limit, when V = 0. Intuition would
15 The probability of PDB at any time also depends on the initial beliefs π iτ−1 and πmτ−1. In the appendix
I show that, in the limit, the starting beliefs do not matter, so I abstract from them in the discussion.
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Fig. 1 This figure illustrates the relationship between the left-hand and the right-hand sides of (10) as λ
varies, when μ = 0.5. The solid lines represent Lλ and the dashed lines represent Γ L + (1 − Γ ) Lμ for
three different values of the signal precision: p = 0.6 (bottom), p = 0.75 (middle) and p = 0.9 (top).
Increasing μ would exacerbates the effect of a high-precision signal, widening the gap between the two
lines, more so for the top than for the bottom pair
suggest that contrarian selling could take place when V = 1 for high levels of λ. That
is, for high enough λ the complement of condition (9) could hold. This is not the case.
Although the rate at which information is leaked is low and the realization of type II
traders makes traders’ beliefs incorporate information very slowly, when λ is high the
price is even stickier. Contrarianism relies on the over-reactivity of the price, which is
dampened for high levels of λ.
To illustrate, notice that when t → ∞ and V = 1, the inequality in (9) can be
written as:
Γ L + (1 − Γ ) Lμ > Lλ (10)
The left-hand side of (10) expresses how information is, on average, incorporated in
traders’ beliefs given the rate of information leakage, while the right-hand side of
(10) expresses how information is incorporated in the price. When the rate at which
information is leaked equals zero (i.e., when λ = 1), (10) is satisfied with equality as
Lλ = Lμ . In this instance, there is no asymmetric information between traders and
the market maker: price and beliefs are always aligned like in a market à la Glosten
and Milgrom. When λ = 0 there is no noise and the rate at which information is leaked
equals one. Then, (10) is satisfied with equality as Lλ = L: no PDB is possible as the
market maker fully incorporates information in the price. Figure 1 illustrates that (10)
holds strictly for all λ ∈ (0, 1) when V = 1, making contrarian selling not possible.
Overall, in this market, the price is always expected to be sticky relative to the
traders’ beliefs, leading to herding almost surely, as formalized in Proposition 1. The
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limit behavior of this market alternates periods of normal trading and herd buying
when V = 1, and normal trading and herd selling when V = 0.
The next result is a corollary to Proposition 1. Together with Proposition 1, it allows
to conclude that, in the limit, the price of a market affected by PDB is more informative
of the true state of the world than in a Glosten–Milgrom market.
Corollary 1 Herd behavior decreases the deviation of the asset price from its true
value, namely E
[|V mt+1 − V | | V,Ft
]
. In the limit, as t → ∞, herd behavior improves
price informativeness compared to a market à la Glosten and Milgrom.
Proof See Appendix A.5. unionsq
3.2 Probability of path-dependent behavior
The previous section established that herding occurs almost surely in the limit. Propo-
sition 2 helps to understand how the probability of PDB evolves over time and with
respect to the quality of private information p.
Proposition 2 Define t∗∗ = 11−λ + 1. For every λ ∈ (0, 1) and for every μ ∈ (0, 1],
if t > t∗∗ there exists p∗∗ (λ, μ, t) such that:
1) PDB is more likely the better the quality of traders private information for
p > p∗∗;
2) PDB is less likely the better the quality of traders private information for p < p∗∗.
Moreover, ∂p
∗∗
∂t < 0. If t < t∗∗, PDB is less likely the better the quality of traders
private information for every p ∈ ( 12 , 1
)
.
Proof See Appendix A.6. unionsq
The effect of the signal precision p on PDB is twofold. On the one hand a high p
exacerbates the asymmetry of information coming from the traders’ and the market
maker’s different interpretations of the trading history. Given some trading history,
this will hold more weight in generating PDB, the higher is p. On the other hand, a
high p makes it more difficult for a trader to disregard his precise private signal to
follow the crowd. PDB occurs when the first effect is stronger than the latter.
In order for PDB to occur, the trading history needs to overwhelm individuals’
private information. Prior to t∗∗ the trading history does not have much weight and an
increase in the signal precision makes it less likely for a trader to disregard his private
information to follow the information contained in the relatively short trading history.
The likelihood of PDB is decreasing in p.
After t∗∗ the trading history has more weight. For low values of p < p∗∗ it is still
the case that the likelihood of PDB is decreasing in p. However, for p > p∗∗, an
increase in p makes the traders’ and the market maker’s different interpretations of
the trading history matter more, increasing the probability of PDB.
When λ is small (but not equal to zero), the t∗∗ is small. In this case, the leakage
rate is high and the trading history can soon be overwhelming individuals’ private
information. The larger the leakage rate, the faster this asymmetry of information
matters.
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The probability of PDB is likely to unfold as follows. Initially, the trading history
does not have much weight and increasing the signal precision strengthens the traders’
private signal, making it more difficult for them to act against it to follow the direction
of the trading history. After a number of trading rounds t∗∗, the trading history gains
weight, which makes a signal precision higher than p∗∗ favor PDB. The more time
passes, the lower the threshold p∗∗ above which the likelihood of PDB is increasing
in the quality of information.
4 Learning from the trading activity
Do poorly informed markets and well-informed markets act alike? This point was
first raised by AZ in their analysis of composition uncertainty. According to AZ,
there is composition uncertainty “when the probability of traders of different types
is not common knowledge,” where a type is defined by a trader’s signal precision.
AZ observe that “trading patterns in a market with many poorly informed traders
and herding mimic the trading patterns in a market with well-informed traders. In a
poorly informed market, a sequence of buy orders is natural because of herding. In
a well-informed market, a sequence of buy orders is also natural because the agents
tend to have the same (very informative) private signal. Without the knowledge of
the composition of the market, it can then become difficult to distinguish whether a
sequence of buy orders reveals a large amount of information about value uncertainty
(because the market is well informed) or almost none at all (because the market is
poorly informed and informed traders are herding).”
The market modeled in this paper does not address composition uncertainty. In fact,
even if we regard the two types as having different signal precisions, with type I traders
having precision p and type II traders having an average precision μ2 + (1 − μ) p,
the probability of the realization of a type, λ, is common knowledge. Making λ not
common knowledge would change the way the market maker sets the price, as he
would have to learn both about the value of the asset and about λ. The analysis of such
a modified market is nontrivial16 and it is beyond the scope of this paper. In any case,
a market maker who knows the overall probability of noise trading λμ and the quality
of private information p, but who is unaware of information leakage, would set prices
à la Glosten and Milgrom without too much disruption to the trading activity. In fact,
as shown in Appendix A.1, the rational expectation price cannot avert PDB any more
than the price of a naive market maker who is not aware of PDB taking place. The
only effect of the unawareness of the marker maker would be on the time the market
takes to recover from PDB, as price movements would be slower.
The questions addressed here are: what can an external observer or market analyst
infer by observing the trading activity? How does misinterpreting the market structure
(parametrized by λ) affect the estimation of the quality of information in the market?
These questions have more than just academic relevance. Wrongly estimating the
informational content of trades could have repercussions in the evaluation of adverse
16 Due to its complexity, AZ carry out the analysis of price paths under composition uncertainty by means
of numerical simulation.
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selection faced in a market. As an example of how this can lead to inefficiencies,
think of an investment manager or a trader formulating trading strategies to maximize
the value of the portfolio under management. The trade-off faced is between acting
immediately and incurring liquidity costs, or waiting in the hope for more favorable
terms of trade and potentially being exposed to opportunity costs. Underestimating
adverse selection by underestimating the informational content of trades will likely
lead to acting too early and incurring high costs of execution. On the other hand,
overestimating the costs of adverse selection could lead one to wait too long and see
the price move prior to execution, eroding the value of the investment.
Consider a market having information precision p, probability of noise trading λμ,
and leakage rate Γ = 1−λ1−λμ . Furthermore, consider an analyst who knows the correct
probability of noise trading λμ but who doesn’t know the information leakage rate. In
this section I consider what such an observer infers from observing the trading history.
Let Γ̂ be the analyst’s estimate of Γ and suppose this estimate is either an over-
estimate
(
Γ̂ > Γ
)
or an underestimate
(
Γ̂ < Γ
)
. The estimate must be a percentage
of the total information and so Γ̂ ∈ [0, 1], which implies the analyst’s estimate of the
fraction of type II traders λ̂ ≥ λμ.
The following proposition states that an analyst (over) underestimating the leakage
rate will always (under) overestimate the quality of private information when trying to
infer it from the trading history, namely p̂ > p. Conversely, if the analyst (under) over-
estimates the quality of private information, it must be that he is (over) underestimating
the leakage rate, namely Γ̂ < Γ (or λ̂ > λ).
Proposition 3 Consider a market having signal precision p and information leakage
rate given by Γ = 1−λ1−λμ , with 0 ≤ λ,μ ≤ 1. Consider a market analyst guessing a
leakage rate Γ̂ = 1−̂λ1−̂λμ̂ such that λ̂μ̂ = λμ. Then, p̂ ≥ p if and only if Γ̂ ≤ Γ .
Proof See Appendix A.7. unionsq
To illustrate, consider an analyst who studies the trading data of a single stock from
the TAQ dataset, which contains both the quotes (bid and ask prices) and the price at
which each single transaction has occurred. From this data, using the standard Lee-
Ready algorithm (Lee and Ready 1991) to classify trades, a history of order imbalance
bmt − smt for the stock can be obtained.
The analyst, observing the trading data after markets have closed, can observe infor-
mation events and realizations of V . Using these observations, the analyst partitions the
time series around information events in order to estimate the quality of information
in the market. Information events could be known events such as dividend announce-
ments, central bank announcements, jobs reports, etc., or informal news events that
the analyst can infer from price movements. The important thing is that the analyst
can determine the new value of the asset after the information event has occurred.
In the language of the present model, the analyst is able to study the trading history
conditioning on the true value of the asset, V = 1 or V = 0.
Consider the extreme case where the analyst embarks in his estimation completely
unaware of information leakage, i.e., Γ̂ = 0. The analyst believes he is observing
a GM market where the probability of a noise trader is λ̂μ̂ = λμ, and the signal
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precision is p̂ instead of p. Let O I G MT be the Glosten–Milgrom order imbalance at
time T . Then, conditional on V = 1 (this is without loss of generality, as conditioning
on V = 0 is analogous), the analyst believes the observed order imbalance bmT − smT
satisfies the following equation:17
E
[
O I G MT
]
= (1 − λ̂μ̂) (2 p̂ − 1) T . (11)
In the actual market the analyst is observing, the information is leaked at a rate Γ > 0.
The observed order imbalance at time T actually satisfies:
E [O IT ] = (1 − λμ) (2p − 1) T + 2 (1 − λμ) (1 − p) T nF + n (12)
where the second term on the right-hand side is the expected additional order imbalance
AO IT generated by PDB, F is the expected time between herding episodes and n is
the expected length of a herding episode. Both F and n are functions of p, λ and μ and
their analytical expressions are given by (32 ) and (33), respectively, in Appendix A.7.
The precision p̂ the analyst needs in order to reconcile the observed order imbalance
to the behavior of a GM market is such that the right-hand side of equation (11) equals
the right-hand side of equation (12). Substituting λμ = λ̂μ̂ and rearranging, the
distortion D = p̂ − p in the inference of the signal precision by an external observer
is equal to:
D = (1 − p)F
n
+ 1 . (13)
This is plotted in Fig. 2, which shows that, for every value of λ, there exists a precision
level p¯ such that the distortion in the inference of the signal precision introduced by
PDB is increasing for p < p¯ and decreasing for p > p¯.
The distortion D can be split into three components: the expected time between
herding episodes F , the expected length of a herding episode n, and the likelihood
of an incorrect signal 1 − p. The graphs of F and n (see Fig. 5 in Appendix A.7)
are, respectively, decreasing and increasing in the signal precision for any level of λ
and μ. This means that, through both F and n, a higher signal precision contributes
to a larger D. In particular, when p is high, it takes less time to build a difference in
beliefs between traders and market maker leading to herd behavior. Moreover, once in
an herding episode, it takes longer for the belief of the market maker to catch up with
the belief of the traders. This is because the higher the signal precision, the higher the
informational content of the last trade before herding starts, which is the one pushing
17 When V = 1, the vector XT = (hT , lT , biT , siT ) has multinomial distribution (T ;μ) where:
μ =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
(1 − λ) p
(1 − λ) (1 − p)
λ (1 − μ) p + λμ2
λ (1 − μ) (1 − p) + λμ2
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦
It follows that for every T , E[XT ] = T μ.
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Fig. 2 The figure plots the distortion in the inference of the signal precision by an outside observer, when
μ = 0.5. For better visualization, this is split in two parts: the left-hand side for λ ∈ [0, 0.5] and the
right-hand side for λ ∈ [0.5, 1]
the value of an informed trader past the bid and ask prices. For normal trading to
resume, the market maker needs to make up for this misalignment in beliefs during
herding.18
The positive impacts of p on the distortion D through F and n last until some level
of precision p¯ above which the negative effect through 1 − p takes over. Then, as p
increases, the likelihood of receiving an incorrect signal decreases, which reduces the
distortion herding has on trading decisions by hiding incorrect signals.
In a market where information leaks, herding is expected to impact the trading
activity by hiding incorrect signals in a way that increases the order imbalance in the
direction of the true state of the world. Overall, when the signal precision is either high
or low, the additional order imbalance due to information leakage is not very large.
In the former case, this is because herding is relatively infrequent. In the latter case,
although herding is frequent, it goes, on average, in the direction of the true state of the
world, hiding mostly correct signals. Thus, the impact on the actual trading activity is
small.
Consider now an observer who is aware of the possibility of informational leakages.
The left panel of Fig. 3 plots the level curves of the expected additional order imbalance
as a fraction of the total trading periods: E[AO IT ]T . In expectation, the same level can
be generated by different pairs (p, λ) showing that the trade-off between p and λ is
non-monotonic. This reflects the non-monotonic/differential impact in the price and
the traders’ beliefs of a variation of p and λ, as highlighted by Eq. (10) and by Fig. 1.
When information is leaked at a high rate (λ small), the price is very reactive and
an increase in λ has a larger impact in making the price sticky than on traders being
exposed to a smaller amount of information, increasing the overall E [AO IT ]. In order
to bring it back to a lower level, the quality of information available to the market needs
to decrease.
18 In particular, n > 1 only if the last trade before herding is of type I.
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Fig. 3 This figure plots the level curves corresponding to different values of order imbalance as a function
of p and λ, for the case of μ = 0.5. The left panel shows the expected “additional” order imbalance caused
by herd behavior on top of the order imbalance generated during normal periods of trading. The right panel
shows the overall levels of expected order imbalance in a marker with herd behavior
When information is leaked at a low rate (λ large) the price is already very sticky
and a change in λ does not affect it very much. An increase in λ makes the traders less
informed. This needs to be counterbalanced by a better quality of information (i.e.,
larger p) to keep E [AO IT ] constant.
The trade-off between p and λ is muted for very high levels of the signal precision.
When p is very close to one, the number of incorrect signals that are hidden by herding
decreases, and so does E [AO IT ]. Similarly, the trade-off is not very strong when p
is close to 0.5, as only very little herd behavior is expected.
The right panel of Fig. 3 plots the level curves for (12) as a fraction of the total
trading periods and illustrates that, despite the non-monotonic behavior of the trade-
off between p and λ, the magnitude of E [AO IT ] is negligible compared to the bulk
of order imbalance generated by periods of normal trading. The latter displays a
monotonic trade-off between p and λ, which dominates. In the long run, an ana-
lyst who knows the correct leakage ratio can learn p from observing the trading
activity.
The fact that the impact of E [AO IT ] is negligible does not mean that the market
does not spend a lot of time herding. Proposition 2 establishes that herding is more
likely, under suitable conditions, for higher levels of the signal precision. This is
precisely when herding mainly “hides” signals that would have made the traders act
in the same direction as herding does. Figure 4 plots the volumetric μ-slices for the
percentage of time the market is expected to be herding as a function of p and λ, which
is defined as nF+n . The left-hand panel slices the volume at μ = 0.8, while the right-
hand panel slices it at μ = 1. For these two values, regardless the amount and quality
of information, it is either almost all leaked (μ = 0.8) or it is all leaked (μ = 1). In
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Fig. 4 This figure plots the slices at μ = 0.8 (left panel) and μ = 1 (right panel) of the volume having 3-D
coordinates (p, λ, μ). The plots illustrate the intensity of herding within the volume by mapping values to
colors
the latter case, for a very high quality of information (p > 0.95) there are levels of
λ at which the market is expected to spend half of the time herding. The intuition is
again that what makes herding likely is a right balance between informational leakage
and price stickiness, which occurs for moderate values of λ. Even for lower levels of
μ, Fig. 4 shows that very precise information is disregarded more than 30% of the
time.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I construct a mechanism that leads to PDB by exploiting the informational
leakage naturally occurring on trading floors. My formulation has the advantage of
recovering PDB with a smaller state space than the state space required for event
uncertainty. This enables the model to link the formation of price and market beliefs
to the quality of information throughout time. The result is that the comparative statics
can be conducted in terms of exogenous variables only, leading to the conclusion
that, given any trading history, there is always a threshold for the signal precision
above which PDB occurs. A further implication of the model is that only herding
in the direction of the true state of the world survives in the limit, without causing
catastrophic effects on the price and actually improving its informativeness. Moreover,
as the weight of the trading history increases, higher signal precisions increase the
probability of PDB.
Medium levels of information leakage create the right mix of price stickiness
and asymmetry of information such that, when information is very precise, the
market spends a sizeable amount of time herding. A market analyst who underes-
timates/overestimates the rate of information leakage will overestimate/underestimate
the informational content of trades, with consequences on the profitability of his trad-
ing strategies.
Besides allowing for PDB, I believe this mechanism is interesting per se, as a way
to model the exchange of information among traders. Its simplicity is helpful to bring
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it to the data in order to estimate the rate at which information is leaked in markets,
a phenomenon that has been widely witnessed and studied by the financial sociology
literature. Future work can estimate the model’s parameters via maximum likelihood,
using a similar methodology to Easley et al. (1997) and Cipriani and Guarino (2014).
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tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
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A Appendix
A.1 Market Maker Pricing Rule
Define J (Ft ) =
{
j : G jt is compatible with Ft
}
. Then,
{
G jt
}
j∈J (Ft )
is the family of
type histories at time t compatible with Ft . To simplify notation, I will equivalently
use
{
G jt
}
j
when it does not lead to confusion. Suppose that at t the first possibility
of herd/contrarian buying arises on G j∗t , where j∗ ∈ arg max j∈J (Ft ) Ei
[
V | G jt
]
. We
know that j∗ is unique. Indicate with V Bt−1 the valuation of the asset by a trader i
who has observed G j∗t . We can write the market maker’s valuation of the asset as the
weighted sum of the value of the asset along the paths
{
G jt
}
j
with weights given by
the probability of each of the paths given the trading history. We can then rewrite V mt−1
as
V mt−1 = E [V | Ft ] = Pr (V = 1 | Ft ) =
Pr (Ft | V = 1) Pr (V = 1)
Pr (Ft )
=
∑
i Pr
(Git | V = 1
)
Pr (V = 1)
Pr (Ft )
=
∑
i
Pr
(
V=1|Git
)
Pr
(Git
)
Pr(V=1) Pr (V = 1)
Pr (Ft ) =
∑
i Pr
(
V = 1 | Git
)
Pr
(Git
)
Pr (Ft ) (14)
Using the fact that Pr
(Ft | Git
) = 1,
Pr
(
Git | Ft
)
Pr (Ft ) = Pr
(
Ft | Git
)
Pr
(
Git
)
= Pr
(
Git
)
.
It follows that
Pr
(Git
)
Pr (Ft ) = Pr
(
Git | Ft
)
(15)
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and we can rewrite (14) as
V mt−1 =
∑
i
Pr
(
V = 1 | Git
)
Pr
(
Git | Ft
)
. (16)
To ease notation, we use at = B to indicate a buy. Using the law of conditional
expectations and Bayes’ rule we can write (3) as
Pr (V = 1 | at = B,Ft ) = Pr (Ft , at = B, V = 1)Pr (at = B,Ft ) ,
= Pr (at = B,Ft , V = 1)
Pr (at = B,Ft , V = 1) + Pr (at = B,Ft , V = 0) ,
= Pr (Ft | at = B, V = 1) Pr (at = B, V = 1)
Pr (Ft | at = B, V = 1) Pr (at = B, V = 1) + Pr (Ft | at = B, V = 0) Pr (at , V = 0) .
Since
{Git
}
i “partitions” Ft ,
Pr (V = 1 | at = B,Ft )
=
∑2t
i=1 Pr
(Git | at = B, V = 1
)
Pr (at = B, V = 1)
∑2t
i=1
[
Pr
(Git | at = B, V = 1
)
Pr (at = B, V = 1) + Pr
(Git | at = B, V = 0
)
Pr (at = B, V = 0)
] ,
=
∑2t
i=1 Pr
(
at = B | V = 1,Git
)
Pr
(
V = 1 | Git
)
Pr
(Git
)
∑2t
i=1
[
Pr
(
at = B | V = 1,Git
)
Pr
(
V = 1 | Git
)
Pr
(Git
) + Pr (at = B | V = 0,Git
)
Pr
(
V = 0 | Git
)
Pr
(Git
)] .
Dividing both the numerator and the denominator by Pr (Ft ) and using (14), the
numerator can be written as
2t∑
i=1
Pr
(
at = B | V = 1,Git
)
Pr
(
V = 1 | Git
)
Pr
(
Git | Ft
)
. (17)
On G j∗t , the probability of a buy order differs from the probability in other type paths,
as traders herd and buy regardless of their signal. In particular,
Pr
(
at = B | V = 1,Git
)
=
[
λμ
2
+ (1 − λμ) p
]
for i = j∗,
Pr
(
at = B | V = 1,Git
)
=
[
λμ
2
+ (1 − λμ) (p + 1 − p)
]
for i = j∗.
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We can the rewrite (17) as
[
λμ
2
+ (1 − λμ) p
] 2t∑
i=1
Pr
(
V = 1 | Git
)
Pr
(
Git | Ft
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V mt−1
+ (1 − λμ) (1 − p) Pr
(
V = 1 | G j∗t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V Bt−1
Pr
(
G j∗t | Ft
)
.
It follows that
E
[
V | Ft , at = buy
]
=
[
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) p
]
V mt−1 + (1 − λμ) (1 − p) V Bt−1ηBt
[
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) p
]
V mt−1 + (1 − λμ) (1 − p) V Bt−1ηBt +
[
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) p
]
V mt−1 + (1 − λμ) p
(
1 − V Bt−1
)
ηBt
(18)
where ηBt = Pr
(
G j∗t | Ft
)
is the probability of the path leading to herd-
ing/contrarianism. Q.E.D.
It is left to show that (18) is indeed a rational expectations price. In order to do so,
I introduce a “naive” market maker, meaning a marker maker who sets bid and ask
prices assuming that every informed trader follows his signal even when the conditions
for PDB are in place. Correspondingly, his pricing rule satisfies:
Anaivet = E
[
V | Ft , V it
(
Ft , Tt , σ i = H
)
> Anaivet
]
,
Bnaivet = E
[
V | Ft , V it
(
Ft , Tt , σ i = L
)
> Bnaivet
]
.
I am going to show that if a trader buys with a low signal at Anaivet then he still buys at
E
[
V | Ft , at = buy
]
, which is then the competitive rational expectation equilibrium
price.
Lemma 1 Consider a trading history Ft and a type history G jt compatible with it
such that V it
(
G jt , σ i = L
)
> ANaivet . Then,
V it
(
G jt , σ i = L
)
> E
[
V | Ft , at = buy
]
.
The converse is also true. Hence, At = E
[
V | Ft , at = buy
]
is a rational expectation
equilibrium price.
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Proof V it
(
G jt , σ i = L
)
> ANaivet is equivalent to
(1 − p) V it−1
(1 − p) V it−1 + p
(
1 − V it−1
) >
[
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) p
]
V mt−1
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ)
[
pV mt−1 + (1 − p)
(
1 − V mt−1
)] ,
rearranging,
(1 − p) V it−1
{
λμ
2
+ (1 − λμ) [pV mt−1 + (1 − p)
(
1 − V mt−1
)]
}
>
[
(1 − p) V it−1 + p
(
1 − V it−1
)] [λμ
2
+ (1 − λμ) p
]
V mt−1.
Adding ηt (1 − λμ) (1 − p) V it−1
{
(1 − p) V it−1 + p
(
1 − V it−1
)}
to both sides,
(1 − p) V it−1
{
λμ
2
+ (1 − λμ) [pV mt−1 + (1 − p)
(
1 − V mt−1
)]
+ ηt (1 − λμ)
[
(1 − p) V it−1 + p
(
1 − V it−1
)]}
>
[
(1 − p) V it−1 + p
(
1 − V it−1
)]{[λμ
2
+ (1 − λμ) p
]
V mt−1
+ ηt (1 − λμ) (1 − p) V it−1
}
.
Rearranging,
(1 − p) V it−1
(1 − p) V it−1 + p
(
1 − V it−1
)
>
[
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) p
]
V mt−1 + ηt (1 − λμ) (1 − p) V it−1
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ)
[
pV mt−1 + (1 − p)
(
1 − V mt−1
)] + ηt (1 − λμ)
{
(1 − p) V it−1 + p
(
1 − V it−1
)} ,
which is equivalent to V it
(
G jt , σ i = L
)
> E
[
V | Ft , at = buy
]
. Hence, At =
E
[
V | Ft , at = buy
]
is a rational expectations price. unionsq
One might be tempted to think that the previous result is driven by the fact that the
price of a sophisticated market maker needs to be lower than the price of a naive market
maker because the former is accounting for both a high and a low signal driving the
buy order on G j∗t . This last intuition is true, but it is only part of the story: a buy order
makes G j∗t and its associated high prior V Bt−1 more likely in the eyes of the market
maker, inducing an overall increase in his valuation. In general we always have that
At > Anaivet . Correspondingly, Bt < Bnaivet , confirming the observation that price
volatility increases both during periods of herding and during periods of contrarianism.
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Lemma 2 Consider a trading history Ft and a type history G jt compatible with it such
that E
[
V | G jt , σ i = L
]
> ANaivet . Then At > Anaivet . The converse is also true.
Proof At > Anaivet is equivalent to
[
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) p
]
V mt−1 + ηt (1 − λμ) (1 − p) V it−1
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ)
[
pV mt−1 + (1 − p)
(
1 − V mt−1
)] + ηt (1 − λμ)
{
(1 − p) V it−1 + p
(
1 − V it−1
)}
>
[
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) p
]
V mt−1
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ)
[
pV mt−1 + (1 − p)
(
1 − V mt−1
)] .
Rearranging,
{
λμ
2
+ (1 − λμ) [pV mt−1 + (1 − p)
(
1 − V mt−1
)]
}
ηt (1 − λμ) (1 − p) V it−1
> ηt (1 − λμ)
{
(1 − p) V it−1 + p
(
1 − V it−1
)} [λμ
2
+ (1 − λμ) p
]
V mt−1,
which is equivalent to
(1 − p) V it−1
(1 − p) V it−1 + p
(
1 − V it−1
) >
[
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) p
]
V mt−1
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ)
[
pV mt−1 + (1 − p)
(
1 − V mt−1
)] ,
which concludes the proof. unionsq
We have established that E
[
V | G j∗t , σ i = L
]
> At > Anaivet . This is easily
interpreted if we observe that, by moving from the highest of the valuations to the
lowest, we are “losing” something either at the level of information or at the level of
rationality. In fact, if E
[
V | G j∗t , σ i = L
]
is the valuation of a fully informed and
fully rational agent, At is the valuation of a partially informed and fully rational agent,
to conclude with Anaivet , which is the valuation of a partially informed and partially
rational agent.
One consequence of these results is that, at every time period t , investigating the
conditions for path-dependent behavior under the pricing rule of a naive market maker
is equivalent to studying the same market under a sophisticated market maker. This
does not mean that using the pricing rule of a market maker who is always naive is
equivalent to using the pricing rule of a market maker who is not. The simplification
is used to check conditions at a specific t , not as the market maker’s pricing rule over
time.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Path-dependent buying occurs when E
[
V | Ft , Tt , σ i = L
]
> At . By proposition (1),
this is equivalent to E
[
V | Ft , Tt , σ i = L
]
> Anaivet which, in the case of first-time
herding, can be written as
p(ht−1−lt−1−1)
[
μ
2 + (1 − μ) p
]bit−1−sit−1
p(ht−1−lt−1−1)
[
μ
2 + (1 − μ) p
]bit−1−sit−1 + (1 − p)(ht−1−lt−1−1) [μ2 + (1 − μ) (1 − p)
]bit−1−sit−1
>
[
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) p
]bmt−1−smt−1+1
[
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) p
]bmt−1−smt−1+1 +
[
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) (1 − p)
]bmt−1−smt−1+1
. (19)
As long as no PDB has occurred yet, given the number of and type of buys and sells,
their sequence does not change the market maker’s and traders’ valuations at t . Setting
δt = ht−1 − lt−1, δit = bit−1 − sit−1, δmt = bmt−1 − smt−1 , γt = δt−1δt+1 and
K (p) =
⎡
⎣
[
μ
2 + (1 − μ) p
] [
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) (1 − p)
]
[
μ
2 + (1 − μ) (1 − p)
] [
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ) p
]
⎤
⎦
δit
δt +1
,
the previous condition is equivalent to
Δ
(
p, λ, μ, δt , δit
)
= pγt λμ
2
K (p) + pγt (1 − p) (1 − λμ) K (p)
− (1 − p)γt λμ
2
− (1 − p)γt (1 − λμ) p > 0. (20)
Notice that (20) is never satisfied whenever both δ = 1 and δi = 0 at the same time
at t − 1. Moreover, notice that 0 < K (p) ≤ 1 for every p ∈ [ 12 , 1
]
. As K
( 1
2
) = 1,
we have that Δ
( 1
2
) = 0, while Δ(1) > 0 for every λ, μ, δt and δit . The derivative of
Δ with respect to p is
Δ′
(
p, μ, δt , δit
)
= γt pγt−1 λμ2 K (p) + p
γt
λμ
2
K ′ (p)
+ γt pγt−1 (1 − p) (1 − λμ) K (p) − pγt (1 − λμ) K (p)
+ pγt (1 − p) (1 − λμ) K ′ (p) + γt (1 − p)γt−1 λμ2
− (1 − p)γt (1 − λμ) + γt (1 − p)γt−1 (1 − λμ) p.
At p = 12 this is equal to
Δ′
(
1
2
, λ, μ, δt , δ
i
t
)
=
(
1
2
)γt−1 {
γt − (1 − λμ) − δ
i
t
δt + 1μ (1 − λ)
}
,
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whose sign behaves as follows:
Δ′
(
1
2
)
≥ 0 when δt ≥ 2
λμ
− 1 + δit
(
1
λ
− 1
)
,
Δ′
(
1
2
)
< 0 when δt <
2
λμ
− 1 + δit
(
1
λ
− 1
)
.
The function Δ
(
p, λ, μ, δt , δit
) = 0 implicitly defines δt = ϕt
(
p, λ, μ, δit
)
, every-
where but at
( 1
2 , λ, μ, δ
i
t
)
. We can find ϕt
(
p, λ, μ, δit
)
explicitly:
ϕt
(
p, λ, μ, δit
)
= L + L
λ
L − Lλ + δ
i
t
Lλ − Lμ
L − Lλ . (21)
Define l = ∂L/∂p. Differentiating (21) we respect to p we find:
∂ϕt
∂p
=
(
lλ + l) (L − Lλ) − (Lλ + L) (l − lλ) + δit
[(
lλ − lμ) (L − Lλ) − (l − lλ) (Lλ − Lμ)]
(
L − Lλ)2
The sign of ∂ϕt
∂p depends on the value of δ
i
t . In particular,
∂ϕ
∂p is positive if and only if
δit < 2
l Lλ − lλL
lλL − l Lλ − lμ (L − Lλ) + Lμ (l − lλ) = D (p, λ, μ) ,
where D (p, λ, μ) < 0 for every p, λ and μ and ∂ D(p,λ,μ)
∂p > 0.
Case 1: δt < 2λμ − 1 + δit
( 1
λ
− 1) . When p = 12 we found that Δ′
( 1
2
)
< 0 . Since
Δ(1) > 0 for every λ, μ, δt and δit , we can conclude that Δ
(
p, λ, μ, δt , δit
)
cuts the x-axis at least once. Suppose that Δ
(
p∗, λ, μ, δt , δit
) = 0 and that
δit < D (p∗, λ, μ). This means that if we increase p from p∗ to p′ ∈ (p∗, 1
]
,
the level of δt needed to keep Δ at zero increases. As Δ
(
p, λ, μ, δt , δit
)
is
increasing in δt , this means that, for given δt and δit , if Δ is cutting the x-axis
at p∗ it must be doing it from above. However, as Δ(1) > 0, it must be the
case that it is cutting it again from below. This last fact is not possible, as
∂ D(p,λ,μ)
∂p > 0 , which implies that for any other p
′ ∈ (p∗, 1], we continue
to have δit < D
(
p′, λ, μ
)
: any crossing of the x-axis as p increases must
occur from above. We conclude that we must have δit > D (p∗, λ, μ), and
any crossing of the x-axis for p ∈ ( 12 , 1
]
must be occurring once and from
below.
Case 2: δt ≥ 2λμ − 1 + δit
( 1
λ
− 1) . As Δ′ ( 12
) ≥ 0 and Δ(1) > 0, and given that we
have just established that Δ (p, μ, λ, δt , δit
)
can never cross the x-axis from
above, it follows that Δ
(
p, μ, λ, δt , δit
)
> 0 for every p ∈ ( 12 , 1
]
.
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The analysis of the previous two cases shows that path-dependent buying occurs
either for high values or for any value of the signal precision. If bmt > smt path-
dependent buying coincides with herd buying, if bmt < smt it coincides with contrarian
buying.
To study the effect of λ on p∗, notice that Δ > 0 if and only if Ψ = (δt − 1) L +
δit Lμ −
(
δmt + 1
)
Lλ > 0. As Lλ is decreasing in λ, Ψ increases in λ whenever
bmt < smt , and it decreases in λ when bmt > smt , for every p ∈
( 1
2 , 1
]
. It follows that
∂p∗
∂λ
> 0 when bmt < smt , and that
∂p∗
∂λ
< 0 when bmt > smt . Moreover, Ψ is increasing
in μ for every p ∈ ( 12 , 1
]
. It follows that ∂p
∗
∂μ
< 0.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Consider p = 12 . Then both the market maker and the traders’ valuations will be
equal to 12 for every Ft , every σ and every λ,μ ∈
[ 1
2 , 1
]
. Since we have defined
path-dependent buying only in the case where buying is strictly preferred to any other
actions, then herding is not possible.
Consider p = 1. Then for any Ft and every λ,μ ∈
[ 1
2 , 1
]
, E
[
V | Ft , Tt , σ i
] = 1
if σ i = H (and Ft , E
[
V | Ft , Tt , σ i
] = L if σ i = L) and no PDB is possible.
For p ∈ ( 12 , 1
)
, we have from (19) that path-dependent buying occurs at t whenever
ht−1 − lt−1 > L + L
λ
L − Lλ +
(
bit−1 − sit−1
) Lλ − Lμ
L − Lλ
whose left-hand side is maximized for lt−1 = 0 and whose right-hand side it
minimized for bit−1 = 0. The path just described, where all buys are type I and the
sells are type II, is a unique type path compatible with Ft , and the one with the highest
possible traders’ valuation of the asset associated to it. It follows that path-dependent
buying has positive probability of happening at t whenever
bmt−1 >
L + Lλ
L − Lλ − s
m
t−1
Lλ − Lμ
L − Lλ (22)
I cannot appeal to noise trading in order to say that a trading history such that the
previous inequality is satisfied has positive probability and this is enough to prove
existence of herding because if, in fact, the trading history were generated by at least
one noise buy, then herding could not occur anymore. However, if the market maker
assigns positive probability to herd buying given the trading history, then consistency
implies that, from an ex-ante perspective, this probability must be positive.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Rearranging (19), from the point of view of time τ , the probability of path-dependent
buying at T = τ + t is:
Pr
(
(hT−1 − lT−1)
(
L − Lλ) > L + Lλ + (Lλ − Lμ)
(
biT−1 − siT−1
)
+ Πτ
)
.
(23)
where Πτ = log π
m
τ−1
(
1−π iτ−1
)
π iτ−1
(
1−πmτ−1
) .
When V = 1, the vector X = (hT−1, lT−1, biT−1, siT−1) has a multinomial distri-
bution (T − 1;μ) where:
μ =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
(1 − λ) p
(1 − λ) (1 − p)
λ (1 − μ) p + λμ2
λ (1 − μ) (1 − p) + λμ2
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦
Asymptotically, as T → ∞, the multinomial distribution converges to a multivari-
ate normal distribution N ((T − 1) μ,), where  is the covariance matrix. Then,
conditional on V = 1, as t → ∞, hτ+t−1 > lτ+t−1 and biτ+t−1 > siτ+t−1. The
probability in (23) can be written as:
Pr
(
lim
t→∞
(
hT−1 − lT−1
biT−1 − siT−1
− L + L
λ + Πτ
(
L − Lλ) (bit−1 − sit−1
)
)
>
Lλ − Lμ
L − Lλ
)
= Pr
(
1 − λ
λ (1 − μ) >
Lλ − Lμ
L − Lλ
)
.
The ratio
(
Lλ − Lμ) / (L − Lλ) is decreasing in p for every λ and μ.19 Moreover,
by l’Hopital’s Rule,
lim
p→ 12
Lλ − Lμ
L − Lλ =
(1 − λ)
λ
,
which is always smaller than (1 − λ) /λ (1 − μ) for every λ and μ > 0. Hence, for
T → ∞ the probability in (23) is equal to 1.
We can conclude that, in the limit, path-dependent buying coincides with herd
buying.
At T , the probability of path-dependent selling is equal to:
Pr
(
(hT−1 − lT−1)
(
L − Lλ) + L + Lλ <
(
biT−1 − siT−1
)
+ Πτ
) (
Lλ − Lμ)
(24)
19 This cannot be proved analytically, but it can be shown by computation.
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As T → ∞, this probability becomes Pr
(
1−λ
λ(1−μ) <
Lλ−Lμ
L−Lλ
)
. Since we have just
proved that the complement set has probability one, it must be that the probability of
contrarian selling goes to zero as T → ∞.
Similarly, it can be shown that when V = 0 herd selling happens almost surely,
whereas herd buying and contrarian behavior almost never happen.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 1
Parts of the proof of this corollary follow largely the intuition behind the proof of AZ’s
Proposition 10.
Assume V = 1 and let φ′h = E
[
1 − V mt+1 | V = 1,Ft
]
during periods of herd buying
in a market where information leaks. Let φv be the same quantity, but in a Glosten–
Milgrom market where herding is not possible. Formally,
φ′h = 1 − E
[
πmt+1 | V = 1
]
= 1 − [Pr (at = buy | V = 1) A′t + Pr (at = sell | V = 1) Bt
]
= 1 −
[(
1 − λμ
2
)
A′t +
λμ
2
Bt
]
, (25)
where A′t is the rational expectation ask price as derived in Appendix A.1. Indi-
cate with φh the same quantity as in equation (25), but replacing A′t with the naive
price At . The quantity φv is derived similarly, where Pr (at = buy | V = 1) and
Pr (at = sell | V = 1) are the probabilities of a buy and a sell in a Glosten–Milgrom
market:
φv = 1 −
{[
λμ
2
+ (1 − λμ) p
]
At +
[
λμ
2
+ (1 − λμ) (1 − p)
]
Bt
}
The price is more informative of the true state during herd buying than during periods
of normal trading if the deviation of the asset price from its value is smaller during
herding than during periods of normal trade, that is if φ′h < φv . In particular,
φ′h − φv < φh − φv = (1 − p) (1 − λμ) (Bt − At ) ,
which is always negative.
Analogously, one can prove that herd selling reduces E
[
V mt+1 − 0 | V = 0,Ft
]
com-
pared to the same quantity in a non-herding market.
Appendix A.4 proves that, as t → ∞, only herding in the direction of the asset’s true
value survives a.s. Then, in the limit, herd behavior improves price informativeness.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Without loss of generality, assume V = 1. Path-dependent buying occurs at t whenever
the quadruple
(
ht−1, lt−1, bit−1, sit−1
)
is such that:
(ht−1 − lt−1)
(
L − Lλ) > L + Lλ + (Lλ − Lμ)
(
bit−1 − sit−1
)
+ Π0 (26)
where Π0, the log-ratio of the initial beliefs, will be ignored for the sake of the com-
parative statics. In expectation, (26) is equal to
(t − 1) (2p − 1) [(1 − λ) L + λ (1 − μ) Lμ − Lλ (1 − λμ)] > L + Lλ (27)
Proving that (27) is less strict as p increases is equivalent to proving that (26) is more
likely to hold at t the larger p, which makes PDB more likely the higher the quality
of private information.
Define the function
G (p, λ, μ, t) = (t − 1) (2p − 1) [(1 − λ) L + λ (1 − μ) Lμ
− Lλ (1 − λμ)] − L − Lλ. (28)
PDB is more likely the higher the quality of information p whenever G is increasing
in p. Define g (p, λ, μ, t) = ∂G
∂p :
g (p, λ, μ, t) = (t − 1)
{
(2p − 1) [(1 − λ) l + λ (1 − μ) lμ − lλ (1 − λμ)]
+ 2 [(1 − λ) L + λ (1 − μ) Lμ − Lλ (1 − λμ)]
}
− l − lλ. (29)
g is continually differentiable in p ∈ [ 12 , 1
)
and t . Then, g (p, λ, μ, t) = 0 implic-
itly defines the function
τ (p; λ,μ) = l + l
λ
(2p − 1) [(1 − λ) l + λ (1 − μ) lμ − lλ (1 − λμ)] + 2 [(1 − λ) L + λ (1 − μ) Lμ − Lλ (1 − λμ)] + 1.
Lemma 3 The function τ (p; λ,μ) is strictly decreasing in p ∈ [ 12 , 1
] for every value
of λ,μ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof Defining:
Z (p; λ,μ) = (1 − λ) L + λ (1 − μ) Lμ − Lλ (1 − λμ)
z (p; λ,μ) = (1 − λ) l + λ (1 − μ) lμ − lλ (1 − λμ)
z′ (p; λ,μ) = ∂z (p; λ,μ)
∂p
, l ′ = ∂l
∂p
, lλ′ = ∂l
λ
∂p
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allows to write τ (p; λ,μ) in more compact terms:
τ (p; λ,μ) = l + l
λ
(2p − 1) z + 2Z + 1.
Then, the relationship between t and p (the number of trading rounds that keep the
likelihood of PDB constant as the quality of information changes) is given by the sign
of the following derivative:
∂τ (p; λ,μ)
∂p
=
(
l ′ + lλ′) [(2p − 1) z + 2Z ] − (l + lλ) [4z + (2p − 1) z′]
[(2p − 1) z + 2Z ]2 , (30)
which is negative if and only if its numerator is negative. The numerator is the differ-
ence of two positive terms, whose sign cannot be determined in closed form. Numerical
computation over μ, λ and p shows that the derivative is maximized when p = 12 , and
for all values of μ and λ, on the interior. In all cases that maximum is bounded below
zero. The overall maximum occurs when μ = λ = 0 or λ = 1, when ∂τ(p;λ,μ)
∂p = 0.unionsq
At p = 12 , g
( 1
2 , λ, μ, t
) = −4 (2 − λμ) < 0. Moreover,
lim
p→1 g (p, λ, μ, t) =
{
+∞ when t > 1
(1−λ) + 1
−∞ when t < 1
(1−λ) + 1
Suppose that t > 1
(1−λ) + 1. Then, g crosses the p-axis at least once. The claim is
that g cannot cross the p-axis from above, meaning that it either crosses the p-axis
only once (when t > 1
(1−λ) + 1) or never (when t < 1(1−λ) + 1). By contradiction,
suppose that g crosses the p -axis from above
g
(
p′, λ, μ, t
) = 0 for some p′.
Holding everything else equal, g (p, λ, μ, t) < 0 for every p′ < p < p′ + ε in the
right neighborhood of p′. In order to keep g at zero as p increases, t needs to decrease,
as it is shown in Lemma 3 that ∂τ(p;λ,μ)
∂p < 0. However, by inspecting g’s functional
form, ∂g
∂t ≥ 0 holds for every p, λ, μ. It follows that g cannot cross the p-axis from
above.
When λ = 1, 1
(1−λ) + 1 = +∞: no information leaks and PDB is not possible.
When λ = 0 or when μ = 0, both G and g are always negative: both terms multiplying
t in (28) and (29) go to zero, so there is no possibility to increase t in order to make
G and g positive.
In conclusion, when t > 1
(1−λ) +1, there exists p∗∗ (λ, μ, t) such that G (p, λ, μ, t)
is increasing in p if and only if p ∈ (p∗∗, 1).
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
The statement can be proven by looking at order imbalance, which provides a proxy
for the quantity and direction of the information present in the market (see for instance
Easley et al. (2012)). In this respect, the following lemma will prove useful.
Lemma 4 Consider a market where the total probability of noise trading is λμ and
where information is leaked at a rate Γ . The expected order imbalance at time T is:
E [O IT ] = E
[
bmT − smT
] = (1 − λμ) (2p − 1) T + 2 (1 − λμ) (1 − p) T n
F + n
where F is the expected time between herding episodes and n is the expected length
of a herding episode. Both F and n are functions of p, λ and μ and their analytical
expressions are given by (32 ) and (33), respectively.
Proof Consider a market at T and suppose that V = 1. The expected order imbalance
in a Glosten–Milgrom market is given by (11). In a market with PDB, we need to
account only for the possibility of herd buying, as this is the only PDB that is expected
when V = 1. Indicate with H the number of expected herd buying episodes and with
n their expected length. In a market with PDB and V = 1 the expected difference
between buys and sells is
E
[
bmT − smT
] = (1 − λμ) (2p − 1) T + 2 (1 − λμ) (1 − p) nH, (31)
where nH is multiplied by (1 − λμ) (1 − p) because only herding periods hiding low
signals impact the difference between buys and sells, and it is multiplied by 2 because
a hidden low signal results in one more buy and one less sell, increasing the difference
by a factor of 2. Indicate with F the expected time between herding periods. Then F
is the first integer such that, in expectation, (19) holds just about to trigger herding:20
E [hF − lF ] L − L + E
[
biF − siF
]
Lμ ≥ E [bmF − smF
]
Lλ + Lλ.
Taking the expectations and rearranging:
F =
⌈
Lλ + L
(2p − 1) [(1 − λ) (L − Lλ) − λ (1 − μ) (Lλ − Lμ)]
⌉
(32)
At T , the expected number of herding episodes H can be calculated as:
H = T − nH
F
⇔ H = T
F + n
20 This abstracts from any initial beliefs. If, in expectation, only herding occurs, after each herding episode
beliefs would be π i > πm , which implies that F is smaller than the one computed here. The overall effect
would be in favor of a stronger distortion in the inference of p, but qualitatively it would not change.
123
A. Testa
1
1
2
3
1
4
104
F
5
Expected time between herding episodes
6
0.5
7
0.8
p
0.6
0
0
1
0.2
0.4
1
0.6
n
0.8
Expected length of a herding episode
0.5
1
0.8
p
0.6
0
Fig. 5 This figure plots F (left panel) and n (right panel) as functions of p and λ, for μ = 0.5. For any
other value of μ the plots do not change qualitatively. In particular, F is a decreasing function of p and n
is an increasing function of p, for any λ and μ
The average duration n of a herding episode can be calculated by noticing that
n is such that during herding the market maker’s price needs to catch up with the
informational content of the last Type I buy.
The impact of the period before herding starts if a Type I buy is realized is:
(
log
π i−1
1 − π i−1
− log π
m−1
1 − πm−1
)
−
(
log
π i−2
1 − π i−2
− log π
m−2
1 − πm−2
)
=
(
log
π i−2
1 − π i−2
+ L −
(
log
πm−2
1 − πm−2
+ Lλ
))
−
(
log
π i−2
1 − π i−2
− log π
m−2
1 − πm−2
)
= L − Lλ
The impact of herding in recovering from the gap accumulated in the −1 period is
(
log
π i−1
1 − π i−1
− log π
m−1
1 − πm−1
)
−
(
log
π i−1+n
1 − π i−1+n
− log π
m−1+n
1 − πm−1+n
)
=
(
log
π i−1
1 − π i−1
− log π
m−1
1 − πm−1
)
−
(
log
π i−1
1 − π i−1
− log π
m−1
1 − πm−1
− n′Lλ
)
= n′Lλ
Then normal trading recovers when n′Lλ ≥ L − Lλ, meaning that n′ ≥ L−LλLλ .
As trading starts normally as soon as the price moves by more than the information
contained in the last trade prior to herding, we can take n′ =
⌈
L−Lλ
Lλ
⌉
.
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The impact of the period before herding starts if a Type II sell is realized is:
(
log
π i−1
1 − π i−1
− log π
m−1
1 − πm−1
)
−
(
log
π i−2
1 − π i−2
− log π
m−2
1 − πm−2
)
=
(
log
π i−2
1 − π i−2
− Lμ −
(
log
πm−2
1 − πm−2
− Lλ
))
−
(
log
π i−2
1 − π i−2
− log π
m−2
1 − πm−2
)
= Lλ − Lμ
The impact of herding in recovering from the gap accumulated in the −1 period is
(
log
π i−1
1 − π i−1
− log π
m−1
1 − πm−1
+ n′′Lλ
)
−
(
log
π i−1
1 − π i−1
− log π
m−1
1 − πm−1
)
= n′′Lλ
Then normal trading recovers when n′′Lλ ≥ Lλ − Lμ, meaning that n ≥ Lλ−LμLλ .
As trading starts normally as soon as the price moves by more than the information
contained in the last trade prior to herding, we can take n′′ =
⌈
Lλ−Lμ
Lλ
⌉
. Then, on
average, the average duration of a herding episode is:
n = (1 − λ) L − L
λ
Lλ
+ λ L
λ − Lμ
Lλ
(33)
Figure 5 shows that F is a decreasing function of p while n is an increasing function
of p for any λ and μ in [0, 1]. unionsq
Consider an analyst observing an order imbalance equal to bmt − smt and attributing
it to
E
[
Ô I T
] = (1 − λ̂μ̂) (2 p̂ − 1) T + 2 (1 − λ̂μ̂) (1 − p̂) T n̂
F̂ + n̂
such that λ̂μ̂ = λμ. To complete the proof of Proposition 3 will first show that if the
analyst correctly believes that λ̂ = λ, then it must be that p̂ = p and vice-versa. Then,
the proof will continue to establish that λ̂ > λ if and only if p̂ > p.
1. λ̂ = λ implies p̂ = p. Suppose that the analyst observes an order imbalance equal
to bmt − smt and that he believes λ̂ = λ (i.e., his assessment of the probability of
type II traders is correct). In expectation, the order imbalance can be described by
equation (12). If λ̂ = λ, then it must be that μ̂ = μ to satisfy the requirement that
μ̂ = λμ
λ̂
. Simplifying, subtracting one to both sides and changing sign, we can
rewrite E
[
Ô I T
] = E [O IT ] as
(1 − p̂)
1 + n̂F̂
= (1 − p)
1 + nF
(34)
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As n̂F̂ is increasing in p̂, the entire fraction on the left-hand side of equation (34) is
decreasing in p̂, for every λ and μ, which makes E
[
Ô I T
]
increasing (we changed
sign!) in p̂ for every λ and μ.
Suppose, by contradiction, that p̂ > p. As ∂E[O IT ]
∂p > 0, λ̂ = λ and μ̂ = μ, it
must be that E
[
Ô I T
]
> E [O IT ]. Contradiction. An analogous argument can be
made when we assume that p̂ < p.
2. p̂ = p implies λ̂ = λ. As p̂ = p, setting E [Ô I T
] = E [O IT ] is equivalent to
n̂
F̂ = nF . When λ̂μ̂ is held constant to λμ, the derivative of n̂F̂ with respect to λ̂ is
equal to
∂ n̂F̂
∂λ̂
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣̂
λμ̂=λμ
=
{[(
1 − λ̂) L − Lλ + λ̂Lμ + λμ (Lλ − Lμ)] (2Lλ − L − Lμ)
− (L − Lμ) [(1 − λ̂) (L − Lλ) + λ̂ (Lλ − Lμ)]
} [(
Lλ + L) Lλ]−2 .
The following lemma is useful to determine the sign of the derivative.
Lemma 5 For any p ∈ [ 12 , 1
]
and for any λ,μ ∈ [0, 1], (1 − λ) L − Lλ + λLμ ≥ 0.
Proof At p = 12 , the LHS is equal to zero for every λ and μ . The derivative of the
LHS is:
1 − λ
p (1 − p) +
λ (1 − μ)
(
1 − μ2
)
μ
2 + (1 − μ)2 p (1 − p)
− (1 − λμ)(
1 − λμ2
)
λμ
2 + (1 − λμ)2 p (1 − p)
This is positive if and only if:
λμ2(1 − λ)(2p − 1)2 [(1 − μ)(1 − λμ)(1 − 4p(1 − p)) + (1 − μ) + 2 − λμ] ≥ 0
By inspection, this inequality is always satisfied. unionsq
Given the result in Lemma 5, we can conclude that
∂ n̂F̂
∂λ̂
∣
∣
∣
∣̂
λμ̂=λμ
< 0. Suppose,
by contradiction, that λ̂ > λ. Then, it must be that n̂F̂ <
n
F along the
(
λ̂μ̂ = λμ)-
manifold. Contradiction. An analogous argument can be made when we assume that
λ̂ < λ.
3. λ̂ > λ implies p̂ > p. Suppose, instead, that p̂ < p. Since ∂E
[
Ô I T
]
∂ p̂ > 0(the higher the quality of information, the stronger the asymmetry of information
between traders and market maker, which results in a larger order imbalance, in
expectation) coeteris paribus it must be that E [Ô I T
]
< E [O IT ]. In order to
re-establish equality between the observed O IT and the expected order imbalance
imputed by E
[
Ô I T
]
, as
∂E
[
Ô I T
]
∂λ̂
∣
∣
∣̂
λμ̂=λμ < 0 (a higher λ results in a lower leakage
ratio, which leads to a lower order imbalance, in expectation) one would need
λ̂ < λ, which leads to a contradiction.
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4. p̂ > p implies λ̂ > λ. Suppose, by contradiction, that λ̂ < λ. Since
∂E
[
Ô I T
]
∂λ̂
∣
∣
∣̂
λμ̂=λμ < 0 coeteris paribus it must be that E
[
Ô I T
]
> E [O IT ] along
the
(
λ̂μ̂ = λμ)-manifold. In order to re-establish equality between the observed
O IT and the expected order imbalance imputed by E
[
Ô I T
]
, as
∂E
[
Ô I T
]
∂ p̂ > 0 ,
one would need p̂ < p, which leads to a contradiction.
As λ̂ = λ if and only if p̂ = p, and λ̂ > λ if and only if p̂ > p, it follows that
p̂ ≥ p if and only if Γ̂ ≤ Γ .
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